

PATTERNING OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPE, INTERPERSONAL
UNDERSTANDING, AND MARITAL HAPPINESS

By

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The study investigated personality dimensions as these relate to interpersonal understanding variables. These dimensions and relationships were studied through using the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator in an interpersonal perception or response predicting paradigm wherein participants answered for themselves and also made predictions about their mates' answers. In the 21 marriages ($N = 42$) studied it was found that generally one mate in a marriage was better at predicting his mate's self description while the other mate was better at predicting his mate's predictions of him. This very strong pattern was found to be associated with the dimension, intraversion-extraversion. Persons who were more intraverted were better predictors of their mates' self descriptions, while those more extraverted were better predictors of their mates' predictions of them. Findings with respect to other personality dimensions and understanding

variables were somewhat less conclusive, although several reached statistical significance. There was a small but significant tendency for intermediate values of personality similarity (rather than extreme similarity or dissimilarity) to be associated with greatest marital happiness. There was a small but significant tendency for personality similarity between mates to be positive associated with length of marriage. There was a significant tendency for extraversion to be positively associated with assumed similarity between self and other. There was a significant tendency for reported feelings of being understood to be positively associated with marital happiness. One conclusion drawn was that the ability of a mate to predict his mate's self description versus the ability to predict his mate's predictions of him appeared to reflect two relatively independent processes, which are associated with different personality patterns.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Clinical Observations

Toward a Concept of the Understood Self Through Reciprocal Perspectives

The world is populated by others who are centers of re-orientation to the objective universe. They are not simply other "I's." This presence of others has a profound reactive effect on a particular "I."

Another way of looking at this is that my own field of experience contains my direct view of myself (ego) and of the other (alter). My field of experience also embodies what may be called "meta perspectives"--my view of the other's view of me, my perspective on the other's perspective on me (Laing et al., 1966). Although I am not able to see myself exactly as others see me, the ongoing supposition that they see me in certain ways persists, and I act in the light of the specific nature of this supposition. Thus, my identity undergoes myriad metamorphoses (Laing et al., 1966) or alterations.

Laing et al. (1966) states that these alterations in my

identity, as I become another to you (or him or her or them), are further reinteriorized by me to become multifaced meta identities, or the other I take myself to be for the other person. Thus, to a large extent, I (ego) go about the process of forming my self image by attempting to go through the eyes of the other, by taking the role of the other. As George Herbert Mead (1934) has said, my concept of myself is mediated by the so-called "generalized other." Consequently while self identity (my view of myself) and meta identity (my view of your view of me) may stand as distinct theoretical constructs, in reality self identity is constituted not only by our looking at ourselves, but by our reconstruction of other's experience in looking at us. Thus, self identity in reality subsumes meta identity--where meta-identity is largely propaedeutic to the formation of a self in the sense of a social self or a self and being for others.

The real or actual views by others of me, communicated to me by others, need not be passively accepted by me, but also cannot be ignored (in the sense of having no effect) in my development of a sense of who I am (assuming, of course, some sort of social interaction). Even if another's view of me is rejected, it still becomes incorporated in its rejected form as part of my self identity. In this case my self identity becomes my negation of the other person's view of me.

It is easy to see that recurrence and chronicity of experience construed by me in this negating fashion eventuates in my view of me as one who is being misperceived by the other person(s). Ultimately, this may become one of the core gestalts in my view of myself, that I am a person whom no one understands, or with whom no one empathizes, etc.

It should be evident that one of the important aspects of both one's image of self and of the other is the extent to which one feels the other can or does understand and empathize with oneself. This feeling of being understood (or misunderstood) is an important aspect of each person's self concept as is the feeling of being capable of being understood.

Yet this feeling of being understood or misunderstood may be either desirable or disconcerting. If desirable, its presence may signify a sense of being together, and its absence a sense of solitude. Moreover, people may vary as to whether they would prefer to understand and empathize with, or be empathized with and understood.

Empathy, Understanding, and Related Concepts

The term "empathy" itself is problematic since it has been used in the American research literature with sundry meanings. Yet, however varied the usages and meanings, there

are common descriptive themes which seem to emerge.

It has been said that "to empathize is to see with the eyes of another, to hear with the ears of another, and to feel with the heart of another." (Anonymous English author as quoted by Katz, 1963, p. 1)

When we experience empathy, we feel as if we were experiencing someone else's feelings as our own. We see, we feel, we respond, and we understand as if we were in fact, the other person. We stand in his shoes. We get under his skin. Often we are not unaware of our empathizing. Sometimes we directly ask the other person to empathize with us, as when we ask, "what would you do if you were me?" More often than not, however, we take the part of the other person and expect him to take ours without being aware of our own activities or our expectations of others (Katz, 1963, p. 3)

Katz thus believes that when we empathize with another person our imagination projects us out of ourselves and into the other person. Katz goes on to say:

We have all had the sense of genuine participation in the experience of the other person, even if this experience takes place in our mind's eye, as it were. The husband imagines what his wife must be feeling at a particular moment because he is able to see and hear in his own fantasy as if he were standing in his wife's shoes and is for the moment experiencing her own situation. When a person empathizes he abandons himself and relives in himself the emotions and responses of another person. He is capable of experiencing in himself a mood that is so analogous to the mood of the other person as to represent the exact feelings

of the other person quite closely. He remains an individual in his own right with his own private experiences, but in moments of empathy he experiences the keenest and most vivid sense of closeness or sameness with the other person. (p. 4, 1963)

Thus, empathy first starts as a reaction to the stimulus of personal contact with the other person. Then in the face to face encounter, we feel the contagion of the attitudes and feelings of the other person. Finally vicarious experience grips us and we are involved in as-if behavior. We seem to temporarily abandon our self and become fused with and absorbed in the inner experience of the other person.

Katz believes that in everyday experience we usually empathize with those who are closest to us personally--mates, relatives, friends, and others who are like us and who have had similar experiences (Katz, 1963).

Therapists, of course, have also been interested in, and have described, the empathic process. According to Robert Fleiss, the skill of the therapist depends "essentially on his ability to put himself in the latter's place, to step into his shoes, and to obtain in this way an inside knowledge that is almost firsthand. The common name for such a procedure is 'empathy'" (p. 212, 1942).

Maurice Levine (1961), another analyst, believes that

empathy in therapy, if handled correctly, leads to a type of immediate comprehension of the patient's problems that in many ways is superior to explaining. Explaining is seen as an exercise in logic. On the other hand, understanding, and especially empathic understanding, involves an appreciation of qualities. When we understand a person we know him as a totality--his "parts" are understood in terms of the whole person, the whole in terms of the parts. We realize who and what he is and how he experiences himself.

Analysts, it seems, believe that empathy somehow helps us to understand the other person from within. We communicate on a deeper level and apprehend the other person more completely. Consequently, looked at the other way around once again, being empathized with (as distinct from empathizing with) can become for us a source of personal reassurance, that is, reassurance when we feel someone we like has succeeded in feeling himself into our own state of mind. It is a satisfaction of being understood and accepted (Van Kaam, 1959). Conversely, when friends or spouses fail to empathize, we may feel disappointed or rejected.

Empathy Versus Sympathy

Although "empathy" is not "sympathy," at least with respect to what they mean in the English language as used

in American research, some forms of sympathy seem to be based on the empathic process.

The attitude that we characterize as that of sympathy springs from this same capacity to take the role of the other person with whom one is socially implicated. Sympathy always implies that one stimulates himself to his assistance and consideration of others by taking to some degree the attitude of the other person whom one is assisting. (Mead, 1934, p. 496)

In the above it is clear that there is an intimate connection between empathy and sympathy since sympathy presupposes and, in this sense, subsumes empathy.

Sympathy, however, is more than empathy. Sympathy is empathy plus a shift in attention in feeling for another. In empathy we focus our attention on the feelings and the situation of the other person. According to Gardner Murphy, it is "experiencing within oneself what actually belongs to other perceived persons or objects." (1947, p. 496), whereas, when we sympathize, we are preoccupied with the assumed duality or parallel between our feelings and the feelings of others. We are more concerned with the analogy between the other person and ourselves than with the reality and character of the other person's situation (Smith, 1966). Thus, when we sympathize, we are aware of our own state of mind and much of our attention is devoted to our own needs, while when we empathize, we cannot fully escape our own needs,

but we discipline ourselves to use our own feelings as instruments of cognition. In a sense, then, empathy is a more neutral process than is sympathy. Empathy, of course, may, and often does, lead to sympathy but this is not necessarily the case.

Empathy and Identification

Just as empathy is conceptualized as the precursor to the development of sympathy, but not the same as sympathy, so too is identification conceptualized as the precursor of, but not the same as, empathy. In fact, as we have been conceptualizing the development of empathy for another person, this empathic development might be viewed as being arrived at through a process involving trial identification. Empathy, then, is developed through limited and temporary identification with the other person, but is not restricted to this trial identification. It is the understanding arrived at about the other person via the trial identification that is viewed as empathy.

On the other hand, pure or extended (versus trial) identification is a special kind of role-taking, one that is more lasting, less frequent, and more emotional than is implied in the term "empathy." As defined by Healy, Bronner, and Bowers (1930), identification implies

...the unconscious molding of one's own ego after the fashion of one who has been taken as a model. Primary identification is the earliest expression of an emotional tie with a person. The distinction between identification (primary and secondary) and object-love lies, according to Freud, in a difference between what one would unconsciously like to be and what one would like to have (p. 230)

Wilhelm Reich, speaking for the analytic school in general, states the following:

By identification, psychoanalysis understands the process whereby a person begins to feel at one with another person, adopts that person's characteristics and attitudes, and in his fantasy puts himself in the other's place; this process entails an actual change in the identifying person, inasmuch as the latter "internalizes" characteristics of his model. (1946:1970, p. 46)

These descriptions of identification or pure identification point out the difference between this and trial identification. Trial identification, as embodied in empathy, when compared to pure identification, is seen to be more attenuated, more transparent, and less complete in the sense that the ego of the empathizer is easily retrieved and usually undergoes no permanent change as a result of having identified by trial.

Empathy and the Problem of Projection

Projection refers to a mode of experiencing the other in which one experiences the outer world in terms of one's

inner world (Laing et al., 1966). In projecting, one experiences the perceptual world in terms of one's fantasy system, without realizing that one is doing this. This means that projection is an action whose intentional object is one's own experience of the other. It is not difficult to see, then, that pure projection really tells one nothing about the other person, since it is totally ensconced within one's own fantasy system.

Even worse than telling one nothing about the other, pure projection seems to be an antithetical process to empathy since projection involves the attribution and laying on of one's own wishes, attitudes, and behavior, to someone other than the self. Where projection is involved in the empathic process, the thoughts and feelings of the self are attributed to the other rather than those of the other being vicariously experienced. Consequently, the person who attempts to understand the behavior of others through using projection as the mechanism, assumes that "since this is how I would feel if I were in his situation, then this is how he must feel." Thus, predictions based on projection may or may not be accurate since the projector always runs the risk of distorting reality by impressing onto others his own meanings rather than those of the other person(s).

Empathy and Assumed Similarity

Freudians (Fenichel, 1945), neo-Freudians (Sullivan, 1954), sociologists (Mead, 1934), and psychologists (Rogers, 1951) emphasize that our similarities to others form the foundation of our understanding of them. From the writings of these social scientists the concept of empathy, or empathic understanding, emerges closely associated with the described tendency of a perceiver to assume that another person's feelings, thoughts, and behavior are similar to his own. What is not stated is that the similarities that are assumed can be wrong as well as right, thus leading to mistaken as well as correct judgements toward empathic understanding.

Although each of us assumes some similarity between himself and others, some assume more similarity than others, and some are more correct than others in assumptions of similarity, assuming similarity only where it is warranted, genuine, and real. Thus, at this point it becomes conceptually necessary to make the distinction between empathy and empathic accuracy. Empathic accuracy is the ability to predict and distinguish accurately in what ways we are like and in what ways we are unlike others.

Recapitulation and Summary of the Concept of Empathy

Thus far empathy with another has been conceptualized as the imaginative process of transposing oneself into the other person through trial identification toward reaching an intimate understanding of the other person and his point of view. Empathy is close to, but stands distinct from, sympathy, insofar as the focus of attention is on the other person and his experience, rather than upon the duality of experience between self and others.

Empathy, or empathic understanding, is developed through, but is not restricted to, temporary identification. Pure identification is much more protracted than trial identification from which empathy emerges.

Pure projection tells one nothing about others' experience, because at best it is spuriously accurate and at worst it is antithetical to empathy (being downright inaccurate distortion).

Like projection, assumptions of similarity are often confounded in the empathic process. Thus, it becomes necessary to distinguish between correct and incorrect assumptions of similarity as this relates to empathic accuracy.

By now it should be clear that our focus of concern is starting to converge upon empathic accuracy and how to

disentangle this from projection and assumptions of similarity. As will become apparent shortly, a conceptual and methodological unraveling of these variables is not easy to effect.

Methodological Issues

Methodological Insights into the Concepts of Empathic Accuracy, Projection, and Assumed Similarity

Recent studies in the area of interpersonal perception purporting to investigate accuracy of social perception, empathy, social sensitivity, understanding of others, etc., are usually fashioned around a particular methodological paradigm. Typically this paradigm consists of a set of operations whereby a judge (J) "predicts" how another person (O) will respond (response predicting paradigm). Often, for example, both persons describe themselves on a personality inventory, and J is then asked to fill out the inventory as he thinks O did. The extent to which the prediction agrees with O's actual response is taken as a measure of J's accuracy of some aspect of interpersonal perception (social sensitivity, understanding of others, empathy, etc.).

The procedure employed by Dymond (1949) typifies this methodological paradigm which, to date, has been only slightly modified for use in more contemporary research.

In its more current form this procedure has been called the "response predicting paradigm" (Brown, 1965) and "the interpersonal perception method (IPM)" by Laing et al. (1965). The initial study which Dymond devised to measure empathic ability entailed four parts, each containing the same six character traits:

In the first part the individual was asked to rate himself on a five point scale, on each of six characteristics. In the second part he was asked to rate some other individual on the same six traits. In the third part he was asked to rate the other individual as he believes this other would rate himself. In the fourth he must rate himself as he thinks the other would rate him. (Dymond, 1949, p. 128)

The measure (score) of a person's empathic ability was derived from recording how closely his predictions of another's ratings corresponded with the other's actual rating (a case of simple matching). This response predicting paradigm had considerable face validity, and at least some tentative construct validity based on preliminary research findings (Dymond, 1949; 1950). It soon had more substantial construct validity (Lindgren and Robinson, 1953). Studies in this area flourished with this procedure.

Laing et al. (1966) developed a somewhat similar but attenuated procedure referred to as the Interpersonal Perception Method (IPM). In essence, Laing deletes Dymond's second

part, and otherwise uses parts one, three, and four. To wit, Laing asks married couples (1) to answer for themselves (2) to answer as they think their mate will answer, and (3) to answer as they think their mate will say they will answer. This attenuation of Dymond's procedure is also accompanied by operationally defining empathy (understanding) differently than does Dymond. According to Laing, "understanding can be defined as the conjunction between the meta perspective of one person and the direct perspective of the other." (Laing et al., 1966, p. 29)

Dymond's operational definition of empathy (understanding) may be more complete than Laing's since it incorporates understanding the other person's perspective on himself, plus that person's perspective on the first person. Construed in Laing's terminology (not yet construed in this manner by him, however), Dymond's definition of empathy (understanding) is the conjunction between the meta perspective of one person and the direct perspective of the other, plus the conjunction between the meta-meta perspective of one person and the meta perspective of the other.

Consequently, Laing's definition is a measure of how well one person can determine how another person views and describes himself, however Dymond's definition measures this aspect of understanding plus how well that person can

determine the way in which the other person understands him.

For this reason it seems that Dymond's definitional approach is more inclusive and encompasses more aspects of the concept of empathy-understanding as it has thus far been developed in the introductory discussion. Clearly this additional aspect of understanding can be derived from Laing's operational measures, but thus far has not been derived for use in his research.

Even so, Gage and Cronbach (1955) have pointed out in their early critique of this area that probably any scores obtained in this, or like manner, are difficult to interpret. "This area of research has developed in an ultra-operationalist manner" (Cronbach, 1955, p. 177) Cronbach saw interpersonal perception as an area wherein investigators had become much enamored with operational definitions and their associated face validity. In their classic article "Conceptual and methodological problems in interpersonal perception" (Gage and Cronbach, 1955), they tried to disentangle some of the effects which contribute to social perception scores, and identified separately measurable components (e.g. elevation, warranted and unwarranted assumed similarity, and real similarity). Their analysis showed that investigators run a high risk of giving psychological interpretation to

mathematical artifacts when they use simple measures which combine the components. It seems that a familiarity with the concepts and methodological distinctions delineated by these authors is mandatory for reducing the likelihood of drawing erroneously naive conclusions from the results of an investigation using an interpersonal perception or response predicting paradigm.

Controlling for the Elevation Component

In studies where subjects complete inventories using items which are dimensional (i.e. when item responses range across a scale of numerical values), the problem of elevation arises. Elevation reflects the individual's way of using the response scale. For example, on items, each with numerical response range of -3 through 0 to +3, one person's style of responding may tend toward utilizing the extremes of the scale (e.g. +3 or -3) while another individual may follow a style of central tendency (responding with +1, 0, -1). This phenomenon gives rise to having to consider accuracy of differential elevation (as well as many other elevational problems).

Differential elevation reflects how closely J's average prediction for 0 corresponds to 0's central tendency of response, all items pooled and J's central tendency of response held constant. That is, it reports J's

ability to judge deviations of the individual's elevation from the average.
(Cronbach, 1955, p. 178)

Thus, in some cases style of response or elevation can reflect response sets, bias of the perceiver to use a different part of the scale from that used by the stimulus person, and/or inability to predict what part of the scale the other person will use.

Although not explicitly suggested by Cronbach, these and other problems with elevation could be avoided by using inventories (personality or otherwise) employing dichotomous forced choice, or distinct nonscalar (A, B, C, D) items which do not reflect a continuum or scaled dimension.

Analyzing the Effects of Assumed Similarity on Empathic Accuracy

Consider again the simplest interpersonal perception or response predicting paradigm where the following is present: (a) the judge's self description, (b) the other's self description, and (c) the judge's prediction of (b). According to Gage and Cronbach (1955), the responses have three aspects:

RS (real similarity): agreement of a and b.

AS (assumed similarity): agreement of a and c.

ACC (accuracy): agreement of b and c.

Only two of these three are independent relations. That is, when two of these relations are known, the third may be inferred. Thus, if AS and RS on an item are scored 1 (denoting agreement), ACC must be 1. Scores for the three relational variables are obtained by summing the values obtained on single items. Any score may be considered a resultant of the other two. (p. 415)

Gage and Cronbach schematized these combinations of relationships for dichotomous items as follows:

	a $\neq$ b	a = b
	Real Dissimilarity(RD)	Real Similarity(RS)
a = c Assumed Similarity(AS)	Unwarranted Assumed Similarity(UAS) a = c $\neq$ b	Warranted Assumed Similarity(WAS) a = b = c
a $\neq$ c Assumed Dissimilarity (AD)	Warranted Assumed Dissimilarity(WAD) a $\neq$ b = c	Unwarranted Assumed Dissimilarity(UAD) a = b $\neq$ c

a = judge's self description
b = other's self description
c = judge's prediction

With reference to this schema, Gage and Cronbach point out within the RS items that given a correct prediction by a judge, it is impossible to tell whether he was accurate because he assumed similarity or because of some

psychological process like empathic accuracy. The two are operationally identical. There is no way to distinguish whether "warranted assumed similarity" represents simply a mental set to assume similarity or the ability to judge accurately on a particular item.

However, Gage and Cronbach offer at least one, sometimes useful, aid toward summarizing information about the judge's accuracy of prediction with respect to determining whether he merely has a set to assume similarity or whether he is accurate. They suggest using the correlation between the ratios WAS/RS and WAD/RD. If these ratios are positively correlated, it suggests that individual differences in prediction are more strongly determined by differences in ACC than by differences in AS tendency. Conversely, the correlation will be negative if individual differences in prediction are more strongly influenced by AS than by ACC.

We must give pause here to examine the analysis presented by Gage and Cronbach, particularly the distinction between assumed similarity and accuracy, before concluding that the scores are nearly impossible to interpret, or that the area might be methodologically inscrutable as well as conceptually abstruse.

It is true that the immediate effect of Gage and Cronbach's article was to render invalid or uninterpretable most of the previous research in the area of empathic accuracy since how "accurate judges" achieved their scores became enigmatic in the absence of the raw data on which reports were based. Nevertheless, the critique was far from totally negative.

Gage and Cronbach demonstrated that there are several components of accuracy which can be isolated mathematically and conceptually, while empirically some may be trivial or relatively unimportant. Such may sometimes be the case in the distinction between empathic accuracy and accurate assumed similarity (sometimes called "assimilative projection"). Thus, in some real life situations it may be immaterial whether a person's empathic accuracy is due to either component, although methodologically and conceptually, distinctions may be drawn. In real-life, two-person interpersonal situations (for example, marriage), a person's assumptions of similarity and unconscious projections are typically called into conscious view (e.g. as in marital counseling) and labeled as either unwarranted assumed similarity or projection, only in cases where they are inaccurate. Where either assumptions of similarity or projections are accurate, it becomes merely a conceptual rather than a practical distinction.

On the other hand, when the issue is overall or general accuracy in predicting responses of many other persons the distinction between accurate assumed similarity and empathic accuracy assumes practical importance. Clearly the person who tends toward a strong set to assume similarity (but with little empathic accuracy) will have high accuracy with persons similar to himself, but, of course, will do poorly predicting persons who are dissimilar.

In essence, it might be concluded that what Gage and Cronbach have shown is that answering empirical questions in this area requires extreme care in specification, collection, and analysis of data. Admittedly, this less naive reconceptualization of the empathic accuracy question may cause it to lose some of its simple intuitive charm, that it has held in the discussion prior to now.

Research and Theory on Interpersonal Processes

Research on Assumed Similarity

After Gage and Cronbach's critique, assumed similarity was often viewed as a source of error in empathic accuracy. Although frequently viewed in this way, researchers have also pointed to it as a variable in its own right (Bieri, 1955; Lundy, 1956; Fiedler, 1958, 1964, 1967; Campbell, 1960). Assumed similarity has been found to be positively related

to good therapeutic relationship (Fiedler, 1951, 1952) and, in certain specified situations and conditions, to group leader effectiveness (Fiedler, 1958, 1964, 1967).

One important variable found to mediate between empathic accuracy and assumed similarity seems to be attention. Lundy (1956) found that assumptions of similarity increase while accuracy decreases, as a function of paying attention to and focusing upon self rather than others. This finding suggests that assumed similarity is a set toward others, influenced by direction of attention toward self or other.

Real Similarity, Assumed Similarity, and
Favorability of Stimulus Person and Items
About Stimulus Person

Aside from the effects of assumed similarity on empathic accuracy, reviews of research on interpersonal perception (Bruner and Jaguiri, 1954; Taft, 1955; Hastorf, Schneider, Polefka, 1970) relate accuracy of perception to the dimension of real similarity between judge and judged. Examination of the factors influencing the relations between real similarity (RS) and assumed similarity (AS) should, therefore, provide additional information about the nature of social perception which can be carried into the investigation of empathic understanding.

Rodgers (1959) states that studies relating RS and AS

to accuracy of perception have tended to ignore the possibility that the reported relationships may be largely determined by the favorability variable. The favorability variable can be conceptualized from two positions: (1) favorability or social desirability of inventory items, and (2) favorability of the stimulus person. Rodgers (1959) found that with stimulus item favorability controlled in rating another person (by using items having relatively equal favorability connotations), AS did not vary with RS. Moreover he found that a person's AS score is typically higher for stimulus persons he regards favorably than for those he regards unfavorably. He points out that this favorability component in the AS score becomes critical when AS scores and accuracy scores are related to RS measures.

These findings suggest that when using an interpersonal perception paradigm (Dymond, 1949; Laing et al., 1966) to investigate empathic accuracy, it would be wise to exercise the following cautions: (1) employ an inventory in which the connotations of the item options tend to be both non-pejorative and equally favorable, so that persons relatively favorable toward each other when predicting each other's responses will not simply give socially desirable responses for self and other, resulting in a high accuracy score, and (2) employ some method to assess the favorability of each person to the other (e.g.

Dymond, 1954) such that this can be taken into account in interpreting the accuracy score. If these methodological requirements are met, then it would seem that, in the case where results point to high empathic accuracy where the judge and stimulus person are high on RS, it would probably be less presumptuous to conclude that the high accuracy score was due to real empathic accuracy, rather than to assumptions of similarity based on social desirability or attraction, than it would be in the case where favorability of items is uncontrolled, and favorability toward the stimulus person is neither controlled nor measured. Thus, item favorability should be controlled and favorability toward the stimulus person should be at least measured for its relation to AS if it is in fact impractical to control, to reduce the effect of increasing AS where people like each other and rate on social desirability.

Similarity of Attitudes and Interpersonal Attraction

The relations between real similarity of judge to stimulus person, attraction, and assumed similarity, need to be explored further. Considerable research has focused on attitudinal similarity and interpersonal attraction. The hypothesis that people will like those who hold attitudes similar to their own has been derived from several

cognitive consistency theories (Newcomb, 1956, 1961; Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1958) as has the hypothesis that people will perceive themselves as being more similar to those whom they like than they really are.

These theories suggest that assumed similarity of attitudes should increase with attraction. In controlling for these effects of real similarity with respect to attitudes, one should expect assumed similarity to vary positively with attraction to other. There is, in fact, support for the position that individuals who like one another perceive themselves attitudinally, as being more similar than they really are. This has been found to exist between husbands and wives (Byrne and Blaylock, 1963; Levinger and Breedlove, 1966). Moreover, the more central and relevant the attitudes, the stronger the relationship (Levinger and Breedlove, 1966). In studies using populations besides married couples, the relation between assumed similarity of attitudes and attraction has been found to be consistent and strong (Byrne, 1961; Newcomb, 1961; Byrne and Wong, 1962; Byrne and Clore, 1966). In addition, some studies suggest conversely that perceived similarity of attitudes increases interpersonal attraction (Newcomb, 1961; Mascaro, 1970; Mascaro and Lopez, 1970).

Several similar theoretical explanations have been advanced for the consistent finding that interpersonal attraction and attitudinal similarity vary together. Typically researchers explain this in terms of some type of positively rewarding validation through interaction (Festinger, 1954; Byrne, 1961; Byrne and Clore, 1967).

Similarity of Personality and Interpersonal Attraction

Similar to the studies demonstrating the often nearly isomorphic relation between interpersonal attraction and perceived attitudinal similarity, the hypothesis of association between interpersonal attraction and perceived similarity of personality has been supported (Beier, Rossi, and Garfield, 1961; Broxton, 1963). However, whether or not interpersonal attraction holds stronger for persons with actual personality similarity or personality dissimilarity (sometimes called "complementarity") is debated. Many studies suggest that persons with similar personalities are attracted to each other (Reader and English, 1947; Izard, 1960; Byrne and Griffitt, 1966).

However, with respect to similarity of personality, positive correlations have not been obtained with the consistency with which they have been found holding between attitudinal similarity and attraction. Moreover, positive

personality correlations are usually lower than attitudinal correlations. These observations prompt Berscheid and Walster (1969) to speculate that if personality similarity is a factor in attraction, it may be a less important one than is attitudinal similarity. At least it is more empirically obfuscated, even if real.

It should be pointed out that most of the studies cited thus far in support of a positive relationship between attraction and personality similarity have investigated this relationship among friends. Within this subject pool area some investigators have suggested, however, that more mature and self actualized persons have less tendency or need to seek out similar personalities (Maslow, 1950, 1953; Izard, 1963).

Research has also been conducted on the question of whether or not actual personality similarities between husbands and wives are associated with marital happiness (happiness can, of course, be considered as an index of attraction). Some investigators find happily married couples more similar in actual personality than less happy couples (Dymond, 1954; Cattell and Nesselroade, 1967) and that happily marrieds generate greater understanding and empathic accuracy toward their spouses (Dymond, 1954).

In sum, the above findings provide a good deal of support for the hypothesis that similarity of personality is a characteristic of happily married couples, and there is some support for the hypothesis that understanding and happiness go together.

Interpersonal Attraction and Personality Complementarity

On the other hand, there are those investigators who subscribe to a theory of personality and need complementarity. They have well considered the hypothesis that certain patterns of dissimilarity between partners might enhance marital happiness.

The basic hypothesis in the "theory of complementary needs in mate selection" is that persons choose to mate with persons who are most likely to provide them with maximum need gratification (Winch, 1952). Winch links need gratification with interpersonal attraction. He theorizes that the gratifications between spouses may be complementary in two different ways: (1) where the needs gratified in one person are different from those gratified in the other person (e.g. ascendance-submission, sadistic-masochistic, succorant-nurturant, etc.), and (2) where the needs of one person are the same as the needs of the other person, but where the person's needs differ in the

intensity such that both are likely to experience need gratification with each other.

To minimize the effects of marital interaction on the personalities of the spouses, Winch studied couples who had been married less than two years and were childless. He found several correlations in the predicted direction and concluded "persons like our subjects tend to select mates whose needs are complementary rather than similar to their own (1954, pp. 245-248)." Many other investigators have reported failure to corroborate this hypothesis (Banta, Hetherington, 1963; Becker, 1964) with some outcomes even tending toward similarity.

Rosow (1957) has suggested that the need complementarity hypothesis might be more likely to be confirmed if need complementarity were analyzed in a framework of more global personality type rather than in a discrete independent fashion of fractionating personality needs. If Rosow's suggestion is taken seriously, then when using a personality inventory in an interpersonal perception paradigm, it might be well to consider a person's accuracy in predicting another's personality profile as well as predicting that individual's responses to items in the personality inventory.

Levinger (1964) feels that the lack of supporting evidence for need complementarity may be due to difficulties

in the conceptualization of the hypothesis, particularly the lack of explicit theoretical basis for deciding beforehand which needs will be complementary with which others and which will not. In addition he states that an implicit assumption has been that need-fit pertains primarily to the marital relationship itself. However, each marriage partner interacts not only with his spouse, but with many others, and the outside environment. Because both partners are simultaneously involved with other people, there may be many substitute sources which can gratify each person's needs. Thus, Levinger feels that a conceptual distinction between internal and external need satisfaction has been ignored and should be drawn.

In conclusion, it may be said that although much interesting theorizing has been advanced dealing with need complementarity, and complementarity in personality, as this may relate to happiness and attraction, the bulk of investigations point to evidence supporting an association between similarity of personality and attitudes and overall attraction and happiness within marriage. It has been generally concluded that with increases in real similarity, increases in perceived similarity (for both personality and attitudes) and increases in understanding and predictive ability, happiness and attraction are increased (Tharp,

1963; Berschied and Walster, 1969).

Personality and Empathic Understanding

Dymond (1949) has found individual differences in empathic accuracy between acquaintances (where accuracy is operationally defined as how closely self's prediction of other's ratings corresponds to other's actual ratings) to be associated with (1) observers' ratings of empathic ability, and (2) ability to take the role of characters depicted in the Thematic Apperception Test. Dymond (1950) has found other personality correlates related to high empathic accuracy among friends and acquaintances. High empathizers tend to have slightly higher I.Q. than low empathizers; they have a lower F% on the Rorschach, have higher weightings on the C side of the M:sum C ratio, have greater production of Fc, and have $FC > CF+C$ (the number of subjects for this analysis was very small, $N = 15$). On the basis of this data, Dymond concludes:

If one can generalize at this point about the personality patterns ... those who have low empathic ability ... tend to be rather immature, introverted, motivated from within, but have some conflict with these motivations. ...

... On the other hand those whose empathy appears to be high from their scores, show rather extroverted personality structures, being more responsive to promptings from without. They are in better balance and more at peace with themselves, not showing as many signs of anxiety and depression as those whose ability is low.

Their emotional contact with others is wider, they are adaptive to others, and their contacts are rich and satisfying. They are sensitive to the feelings of others and display social tact. (Dymond, 1950, p. 348)

Dymond adds the caution: "this work is in every way preliminary and inconclusive (Dymond, 1950, p. 349)."

When studying married couples, Dymond (1954) found high empathic accuracy and understanding to be associated with personality aspects characterized as sociability, calmness, spontaneity, patience, and ability to confide in others, as measured by items taken from the MMPI.

Gough (1954) developed an interesting scale to measure "psychological-mindedness" (the degree to which an individual is interested in and responsive to, the inner needs, motives, and experiences of others). He found that the scores of individuals increase as their exposure to psychology increases. Chance and Meaders (1960) then used a similar scale to measure psychological-mindedness in 96 undergraduate men. After the students listened to tape recorded interviews with two men, they filled out an Edwards Personal Preference Schedule as they thought the men had filled it out. An accuracy score for each student was found by counting the agreement between predicted and actual responses. They found that the most psychologically-minded were significantly less accurate. Considering

this and other results, they conclude the accurate judge is:

... a person who is active and outgoing in social relationships, who likes other people but is not markedly dependent upon them, who is ascendant but not hostile and competitive, and who is not given to intellectual reflections about his interpersonal relationships. The picture is one of an individual who finds significant satisfaction in social activities and carries on his daily life with a minimum of interpersonal or intrapersonal conflict. (Chance and Meaders, 1960, p. 208).

It is strongly suggested in these studies examining personality and empathic understanding, that characteristics such as extroversion, outgoingness, prompting from without and sociability are more highly associated with accuracy in empathy and understanding, than are characteristics such as introversion, motivation from within, psychological mindedness, and intellectual reflection about interpersonal relationships. Consequently, this association between accuracy and extroversion, or extroversive characteristics, might be expected to hold for those studies in which extroversion was conceptualized and measured in manner similar to the above studies.

It is interesting to note that in these (and other studies) relating personality and empathic understanding, the accuracy score is always found by counting the agreement between predicted and actual responses across individual items (total matches).

Aside from the previously discussed methodological criticisms levied against the naive use of this procedure without controls, outlined by Gage and Cronbach (1955), theoretical criticisms might also be brought to bear on this procedure of simple item matching. It is perhaps questionable whether this operational definition of empathy and understanding is close to empathy as theoretically conceptualized especially if empathy for, and the understanding of, another personality style is at issue. If the accuracy in understanding another's personality is at issue, then we encounter the molar-molecular distinction. Thus, if personality of another is considered as a whole reflected in a unique pattern of responses or style across responses, what is important in the prediction task is discernment and accuracy in predicting the other person's pattern of traits rather than predicting the simple, equally weighted, item by item behavior bits. This is true whenever direction of response to certain items reflects a particular personality trait more strongly than do other items. Then accuracy of prediction on these heavily weighted items is more important toward predicting the other person's personality profile. To ignore the individual weighting of items on particular personality dimensions and thus to ignore the possibility of predicting another person's general predisposition to

respond, as reflected in predicting his personality profile, appears to be theoretically and methodologically fallacious. For this reason an interpersonal perception paradigm in which persons predict personality patterns of another might also be included in an interpersonal perception study for comparison with a procedure which measures only simple, equally weighted item matching. At least a demonstration should be given that there is little or no difference between analysis by items versus patterns, before conclusions are drawn that findings are generalizable from both approaches.

Introduction to Psychological Type

The purpose of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator is to implement Jung's theory of type (1923). This theory centers around the notion that much apparently random variation in human behavior is actually quite orderly and consistent, being due to basic differences in the way people prefer to use perception and judgement (i.e. basic observable differences in mental functioning and personal preferences in using these functions). Perceiving is understood as the process of becoming aware of things, people, occurrences, or ideas. Judging is understood as the process of coming to conclusions about what has been perceived (Myers, 1962).

Consequently, if people differ systematically in what they perceive and the conclusions and understandings they come to, they may, as a result, show corresponding differences in their behavior (interests, reactions, needs, motivations, conclusions, judgements, etc.). Adopting this hypothesis, the Indicator attempts to measure, from self report of reactions, people's preferences in perception and judgement, so that effects of these preferences may be determined through research and put to practical use (e.g. psychotherapy, marriage counseling, vocational guidance, etc.).

Under this theory, the Indicator contains separate indices for measuring each of the four basic preferences thought to structure the individual's personality (Myers, 1962, p. 1).

<u>Index</u>	<u>Preference as Between</u>	<u>Affects Individual's Choice as to</u>
EI	Extraversion or Introversion	Whether to direct perception and judgement on environment or ideas.
SN	Sensing or Intuition	Which of these two kinds of perception to rely on.
TF	Thinking or Feeling	Which of these two kinds of judgement to rely on.
JP	Judgement or Perception	Whether to use judging or perceptive attitude for dealing with the environment.

Each of these four preferences may be regarded, developmentally, as a fork in the road of personal development offering divergent paths leading toward different

kinds of excellence. Even a slight preference will suffice to start the person along one path rather than its opposite (Myers, 1971). How far a person will go, and how much excellence achieved, depends upon the person, his energy, aspirations, and perhaps the intrinsic strength of his preferences. Nevertheless, the kind of excellence he tends toward is determined by early (possibly inborn) choice at the fork in the road. Under this theory, people create their type through environmental contingencies of reinforcement and the exercise of their individual preferences regarding perception and judgement. Eventually people holding a given preference acquire the qualities that spring from that preference (e.g. EI, SN, TF, JP).

The EI index

The extravert is oriented primarily to the outer world and tends to focus perception and judgement on people and things. The intravert is oriented primarily to the inner world and tends to focus perception and judgement on concepts and ideas.

The SN index

This index is designed to measure preference between two opposite ways of perceiving: (1) sensing--becoming aware of things directly through one or more of the five

senses, or (2) intuition--indirect perception by way of the unconscious via ideas or associations attached to the outside things perceived.

The TF index

This index is designed to measure preference between two opposite ways of judging: (1) thinking--impersonal discrimination between true and false, or (2) feeling--discrimination between valued and not valued.

The JP index

This is an index designed to measure whether the person relies primarily on a judging process (T or F) or upon a perceptive process (S or N) in dealing with the outer world.

Interpersonal Consequences of Type Similarity and Complementarity

Considered as styles in perceiving and judging, different patterns in psychological type should have considerable effect on processes in interpersonal perception. By far the overriding observation from investigating type similarity-complementarity is that whatever a person's particular combinations of preferences may be, others with that same combination will be the easiest for him to understand and get along with (Myers, 1971). Similar types will tend to find the same things interesting (since they share

the same type of perception) and to consider the same things important (since they share the same type of judgement).

On the other hand, people who differ from each other on both preferences will find it hard to deal with and predict each other. If these very opposite people are close associates, members of the same family, or are married, the constant opposition can be a constant strain. A destructive conflict of personalities can arise simply from the fact that two people are using opposite kinds of perception and opposite kinds of judgement. Yet when the origin of such a conflict is recognized, and understanding of the basis of opposition achieved, it often becomes less annoying and easier to cope with. This seems especially to hold for marriages wherein differences in type between husband and wife can easily give rise to friction. This friction can often be diminished when its origin is understood by the partners.

Carl Jung has stated that the majority of marriages that an analyst sees are "particularly those that go wrong because the types are too different" (Jung, 1923; as quoted by Myers, 1971). This might suggest that analysts and marriage counselors probably encounter more oppositeness than occurs in normally successful marriages. That these observers do, in fact, see a great deal of oppositeness,

tends to confirm the thesis that similarity in type helps toward the success of a marriage and lessens the need for counseling. This selective factor may have contributed to the frequent observation of analysts that people marry opposites for compensation.

Theoretically, of course, opposites could supplement each other in certain joint undertakings. For example, if a couple were approaching a problem which required a task-oriented attitude, each opposite might be likely to see what the other had overlooked. Perhaps, however, too much oppositeness might make it difficult for a couple to work together even with an understanding of their type differences. Myers (1971) notes that the best teamwork is usually done by people who differ on one or two preferences only. This much difference is useful, and the two or three preferences they have in common helps them understand each other and communicate. This notion of partial complementarity might lead one to suspect that married couples who differ on one or two type dimensions might be the happiest and most generally satisfied with their marriages, when compared with those couples who differ on most of their type dimensions and those couples who are identical on their type dimensions. This is an interesting speculation that should be explored through research.

The following schema is offered to conceptualize the possible complementarity of opposites (Myers, 1962, p. 82).

Intuitive needs a
sensing type:

to bring up
pertinent facts

to remember things that
weren't relevant at the
time they happened

to read over a contract

to check records, read
proof, score tests

to notice what ought
to be attended to

to inspect

to keep track of detail

to have patience

Thinker needs a feeling type:

to persuade

to conciliate

to forecast how
others will feel

to arouse enthusiasm

to teach

to sell

to advertise

to appreciate the thinker
himself

Sensing type needs
an intuitive:

to see the
possibilities

to supply ingenuity
on problems

to deal with a
complexity having
too many imponderables

to explain what
another intuitive
is talking about

to look far ahead

to furnish new ideas

to "spark" things that
seem impossible

Feeling type needs a
thinker:

to analyze

to organize

to find the flaws in
advance

to reform what needs re-
forming

to weigh the law and the
evidence

to hold consistently
to a policy

to stand firm against oppo-
sition

Interesting as this theorizing about complementarity may be, the empirical evidence points to choice in marriage partners and the absence of marital difficulty to be related to similarity of type (Myers, 1971). Myers offers several interesting hypotheses why similarity of type between husband and wife can turn out to be more important for marital happiness in the long run than it seems to be at the outset.

First of all, a courtship is seldom conducted on a realistic basis. The woman activates the man's dream of what woman can be to man, and the man activates the woman's dream of what man can be to woman. Each projects his or her own dream on the other, endowing that other with the almost magical importance that belongs to the dream--the phenomenon of falling in love.

Then follows an exciting period of mutual discovery in which each eagerly tries to learn everything about the other including the details of the other's dream. Each is under strong temptation, conscious or unconscious, to retain the other's admiration by appearing to share the other's interests. Eventually, however, every married couple confronts the reality of each other's true nature and interest, although the confrontation may be delayed for some time if the mechanics of daily living pose enough problems to absorb the whole attention of both partners. Yet as soon as they

have time and attention to spare from the mechanics of living, each partner will want to spend it in doing, talking, or thinking about the things that interest him or her. Then the real differences emerge and conflicts may set in.

This theorizing about psychological type and the on-going marital relationship has interesting research implications for interpersonal perception. In accord with the preceding theorizing, one might expect perceived similarity of type to be much more than actual similarity in engaged or recently married couples when compared with long enduring marriages which have had time to become cognizant of the real differences between the partners.

Integration of Hypotheses to be Investigated

The following experimental hypotheses can be drawn from the preceding discussion of theory and research in interpersonal perception, attraction, and Jungian typology: Hypotheses related to personality (type) similarity-dissimilarity and attraction ...

- (1) AS should be positively associated with happiness
(with RS, length of marriage, and item favorability controlled).
- (2) RS and Happiness (two alternate hypotheses):
 - a) Happiness is positively associated with RS
(with length of marriage controlled).

- b) Happiness is associated with complementarity (i.e. dissimilarity). Here dissimilarity will be defined in alternate ways:
1. as dissimilarity across items (i.e. negatively associated).
 2. as part pattern complementarity (dissimilarity) across items (i.e. curvilinearity across items).

Hypotheses related to understanding and length of marriage ...

- (3) AS in more recent marriages should exceed AS in marriages of longer duration (i.e. with RS controlled, AS should decrease with length of marriage--especially unwarranted AS).
- (4) Understanding (empathic accuracy) should increase with length of marriage (with RS and attraction controlled).

Hypotheses related to understanding and type ...

- (5) AS should be positively associated with introversion (with RS controlled).
- (6) Understanding (empathic accuracy) should be positively associated with extraversion (with RS controlled).

CHAPTER II

METHOD

Subjects

Twenty-one (N = 42) married couples participated in the study. They were volunteers solicited through acquaintances of the investigator (i.e. "friends of friends" and "acquaintances of acquaintances"). These participants were from varied areas in and around the University of Florida student community, most being students. In exchange for their time and cooperation they received (1) written and oral feedback and interpretation of their personality type as measured by the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, in conjunction with (2) opportunity to discuss these findings with the investigator in the feedback session.

Typically participants were well educated, young, recently married students (mean length of marriage = 2.8 years, range 3 months to 7 years; mean years of formal education = 18 years for husbands, with a range of 14 to 23 years ... 15 years for wives, with a range of 12 to 18 years; mean age of participants was 24 years, with a range of 19 to 30 years).

Procedure

Participants completed a biographical inventory. They were asked to indicate their age, sex, level and major in education, occupation, number of prior marriages if any, length of present marriage, and number of children. To provide the happiness-attraction criterion, each participant was asked to confidentially respond to a 21-item checklist suggested by Burgess and Wallin (1953) to assess degree of marital happiness (see Appendix B).

Several considerations led to the selection of this particular scale for measuring marital happiness.

Conceptualizing marital happiness can lead to a good deal of debate. The literature reflects a great deal of variability in attempting to reach a consensus. To further obfuscate the issue, this concept is as much a function of cultural values as it is a function of any so-called "socio-psychological reality." The concepts of happiness, adjustment, and satisfaction appear confounded, overlapping, and often highly intercorrelated in the literature. Indeed, some authors subsume happiness under a broader concept of adjustment in marriage (e.g. Burgess and Cottrell, 1939) and purport to demonstrate much of the construct validity by showing high correlation with self ratings on happiness

(Terman, 1938). Some investigators follow a simplistic procedure equating happiness with adjustment in asking marrieds to rate themselves on a scale defining adjustment, which is in fact divided into the two categories of "very happy or very unhappy" (e.g. Landis, 1946).

In line with the above, as precedents, the Locke-Wallace Marital Adjustment Test (1959) is probably one of the most reliable and parsimonious approaches (29 items) to measuring marital adjustment. It is probably the instrument most frequently reported in current literature on marital satisfaction and adjustment. However, this does not appear to tap these dimensions of interest in this study (i.e. happiness). Their concept of happiness-adjustment can be inferred from the questionnaire as:

... the process of adaptation of the husband and the wife in such a way as to avoid or resolve conflicts sufficiently so that the mates feel satisfied with the marriage and with each other, develop common interests and activities, and feel that the marriage is fulfilling their expectations. (Locke, 1951, p. 45)

However, since this, and other marital adjustment scales often subsume not only happiness items or scales, but also items dealing with differences of opinion or preferences on issues and interests, then any scale similar to the above would probably be confounded in association with the Myers-

Briggs Type Indicator in measuring preferences. Clearly then, using a definition like the above, persons maintaining differences in interest and perspective would be by definition less adjusted than those who are similar, whereas theoretically we are also interested in the possibility that these persons may be happier than those who are similar.

Hence, marital happiness is conceptualized, for the purposes of this study, as a subjective feeling of contentment with the whole of marriage, regardless of similarity or dissimilarity of perspectives or interests.

The 21-item "happiness" scale, described by Burgess and Wallin (1953, pp. 486-87) is in fact a subscale from a larger scale measuring overall marital adjustment. As such, the items of this subscale do not confound with differences in opinion on issues, preferences, or interests, and should also yield a wider, more discriminating range of scores than a simplistic approach asking persons to rate themselves as either happy or unhappy.

Continuing with the study proper...upon completion of the biographical inventory and the marital happiness scale, each participant in the study was then asked to complete a standard Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, with administration modified to facilitate integration into the Interpersonal Perception Method (IPM). Each participant

taking the indicator was asked to consider, and to indicate, item by item: (1) his (or her) own response to the item (direct perspective) (2) how he (or she) thinks mate will respond to the item (meta perspective) and (3) how he (or she) thinks mate will say he (she) will respond (meta-meta perspective) (see Appendix C).

After completion of the Indicator, participants were given the opportunity to arrange an appointment with the investigator for (1) explanation of type, and (2) interpretation and discussion of their respective psychological types (i.e. INFP, ESTJ, INTJ,... etc.).

Psychological type was determined by scoring the "direct perspective" items for each participant by using the procedures and interpretations found in the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator manual.

The descriptions of each type given in the manual were thought to be personally useful for the participants, yet they contain no pejorative connotations since they primarily relate to personal preferences. These descriptions were, therefore, thought to be ideal for use in an investigation incorporating feedback of psychological findings. They have, in fact, been used for years by educational and vocational counselors and clients with very favorable results (Myers, 1962).

Determination of Measures of Understanding and Empathy

The following operational definitions will be employed, based on an amalgam and modification of definitions suggested by Dymond (1949) and procedures suggested by Laing et al. (1966).

(1) Understanding is composed of two components: understanding I, plus understanding II. Understanding I is the sum of item agreements (i.e. item matching) of the meta perspective of the one mate with the direct perspective of the other. Understanding II is the sum of agreements between the meta-meta perspective of one mate with the meta perspective of the other. The various perspectives are defined where: (a) the direct perspective is a mate's own response, (b) the meta perspective is how he or she thinks the other mate will respond, and (c) the meta-meta perspective is how he or she thinks mate will say he or she will respond (see Appendix C).

(2) The feeling of being understood (Laing et al., 1966) is the conjunction of one's own direct perspective with one's own meta-meta perspective.

Other definitions, taken from a review of the interpersonal perception literature (e.g. Gage and Cronbach, 1955):

(3) Real similarity (RS) is the number of items on which mates are in fact similar (comparison of direct perspectives).

As Gage and Cronbach's (1955) review indicated, the first portion of the understanding score (understanding I above) can be broken down into the following components:

(4) Warranted (i.e. accurate) assumed similarity is the number of items on which a mate indicates self and other as similar and is in fact correct.

(5) Warranted (accurate) assumed dissimilarity is the number of items on which a mate indicates self as different from other and is in fact correct.

Another measure related to the above components, also discussed for its importance in interpersonal perception:

(6) Overall assumed similarity is warranted plus unwarranted assumed similarity, where unwarranted assumed similarity is the number of items on which a mate indicates self and other as similar and is in fact incorrect.

The hypothesized relationships among the above measures will be evaluated through correlational techniques using the Pearson product moment coefficient, and computation of partial correlations holding the effects of specified variables constant.

CHAPTER III

RESULTS

Accuracy in Overall Response Predicting

The overall performance of persons in the response predicting task was found to be much better than chance:

For understanding I (i.e. the conjunction of the meta-perspective of the first person with the direct perspective of the other) across the 42 participants, it was observed that 4537 items were correct predictions and that 2435 items were incorrect predictions. Chi square = 634, $p < .0001$.

For understanding II (i.e. the conjunction of the meta-meta-perspective of the first person with the meta-perspective of the other) across the 42 participants, it was observed that 4560 items were correct predictions and that 2412 items were incorrect predictions, chi square = 662, $p < .0001$.

Sex as a Possible Variable Affecting Interpersonal Perception Scores

Generally negligible differences by sex were found on the interpersonal perception measures (see Table 1), suggesting that sex is not an important variable determining standing

Table 1
Interpersonal Perception Measures
for Males and Females

Measure	Mean	Range	Standard Deviation
<u>For Husbands:</u> (N = 21)			
Understanding I	108.1905	99-122	6.8920
Understanding II	109.4762	95-123	6.4235
Happiness	22.0952	4-44	9.7519
Assumed Similarity	105.6667	76-135	17.7857
Feeling of Being Under- stood	138.9524	104-162	15.8161
<u>For Wives:</u> (N = 21)			
Understanding I	107.8571	101-119	6.1829
Understanding II	107.6667	96-123	7.6507
Happiness	23.2381	1-45	11.3088
Assumed Similarity	102.4762	76-131	12.6674
Feeling of Being Under- stood	140.0000	118-162	12.5500

on the measures as understanding, assumed similarity, and happiness.

However, considerable differences in personality type patterns were found to hold between males and females (see Table 2). Husbands as a group tended toward greater intra-version ($t = 1.8$, $p < .10$) but not to a significant level while females tended toward considerably more feeling than did males ($t = 3.4$, $p < .01$).

Table 3 presents the parameters and significance values to be considered in evaluating through correlational techniques the hypothesized relationships among the variables. Whenever correlations are presented the reader should refer to this table to determine exact significance values.

Evaluation of Hypotheses

Hypothesis (1) states that AS should be positively associated with happiness (with RS and length of marriage controlled). The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient (hereafter referred to as "correlation") between AS and happiness was found to be small and non-significant ($r = +.06$, $N = 42$) as was the partial correlation between AS and happiness, with RS and length of marriage controlled ($r_{12.34} = +.08$, $N = 42$) suggesting no association between AS and happiness.

Table 2

Personality Measures for Males and Females

Measure	Mean	Range	Standard Deviation
<u>For Husbands:</u> (N = 21)			
E-I*	114.6190	67-159	28.3522
S-N	104.7143	39-151	29.7408
T-F	95.8571	57-131	20.8477
J-P	107.7619	55-155	29.0481
<u>For Wives:</u> (N = 21)			
E-I	101.0952	61-149	21.1138
S-N	105.3810	69-151	26.0355
T-F	115.3809	87-143	15.9577
J-P	100.1429	63-145	20.7227

Note: *persons are classified as being extraverted (or on the "left" side of any type preference dimension) if their score is less than 100, and introverted (or on the "right" side of any type preference dimension) if their score is greater than 100.

Table 3

Interpersonal Perception Measures (N = 42)
Correlation Significance Values
for Testing Hypotheses

Measure	Mean	Range	Standard Deviation
Understanding I	108.0238	99-122	6.4675
Understanding II	108.5714	96-123	7.0370
Happiness	22.5952	1-45	10.4252
Real Similarity	91.7143	78-112	8.9287
Assumed Similarity	104.0714	76-135	15.3359
Feeling of being under- stood	139.4762	104-162	14.1114
E-I	107.8333	65-159	25.6181
S-N	104.0000	39-151	19.5052
T-F	105.6190	57-143	20.8291
J-P	103.9524	55-155	25.2180
Length in Marriage (in Months)	34.0476	3-84	25.9210

One-Tailed p Values:

N = 42: $p \leq .01$, $r \geq .36$; $p \leq .05$, $r \geq .26$

N = 21: $p \leq .01$, $r \geq .50$; $p \leq .05$, $r \geq .37$

Two-Tailed p Values:

N = 42: $p \leq .01$, $r \geq .39$; $p \leq .05$, $r \geq .30$

N = 21: $p \leq .01$, $r \geq .55$; $p \leq .05$, $r \geq .43$

Hypothesis (2) states alternate relations which may hold between RS and happiness: (A) positive association, (B) negative association, (C) part pattern complementarity, or curvilinearity. The correlation between RS and happiness was found to be small and non-significant ($r = +.12$, $N = 42$) while the partial correlation, with length of marriage controlled, was slightly larger ($r_{12.3} = +.23$, $N = 42$) suggesting positive direction, but no significant linear association between RS and happiness. The correlation ratio between RS and happiness was found to be small but significant ($\eta = +.30$) suggesting a slight tendency toward curvilinearity in the relationship between RS and happiness (note: there is no way to control for the effect of length of marriage on this correlation ratio).

Hypothesis (3) states that AS should be negatively associated with length of marriage (with RS controlled). The correlation between AS and length of marriage was small, positive, and non-significant ($r = +.20$, $N = 42$) while the partial correlation with RS controlled was very small and non-significant ($r_{12.3} = +.07$, $N = 42$) suggesting no association between AS and length of marriage.

Hypothesis (4) states that understanding should be positively associated with length of marriage (with RS and happiness controlled).

The correlation between understanding I and length of marriage was small and non-significant ($r = +.05$, $N = 42$) as was the partial correlation with RS and happiness controlled ($r_{12.34} = +.06$, $N = 42$) suggesting no association between understanding I and length of marriage.

For understanding II and length of marriage, the correlation was ($r = -.06$, $N = 42$) suggesting no association between understanding II and length of marriage. The partial correlation with RS and happiness controlled was ($r_{12.34} = +.08$).

Hypothesis (5) states that AS should be positively associated with intraversion (with RS controlled). The correlation between AS and intraversion was found to be opposite of predicted direction ($r = -.21$, $N = 42$) as was the partial correlation with RS controlled ($r = -.31$, $N = 42$) suggesting a significant tendency for AS to be associated with extraversion.

Hypothesis (6) states that understanding should be positively associated with extraversion (with RS controlled).

The correlation between understanding I and extraversion (see Table 4) approached significance in a direction opposite of that predicted ($r = -.26$, $N = 42$) as did the partial correlation with RS controlled ($r_{12.3} = -.24$, $N = 42$) suggesting a slight tendency for intraversion to be

Table 4

Understanding and Type
Preference (N = 42)

	Understanding I		Understanding II	
	Pearson r	Partial r*	Pearson r	Partial r*
E-I	+.26	+.24	-.28	-.31
S-N	+.24	+.17	+.18	+.14
T-F	-.20	-.23	+.18	+.17
J-P	-.06	-.11	+.35	+.33

Note: *with RS controlled.

associated with high scoring on understanding I.

For understanding II and extraversion (see Table 4), the correlation was ($r = +.28$, $N = 42$) and the partial correlation with RS controlled was ($r_{12.3} = +.31$, $N = 42$) suggesting a significant tendency for extraversion to be associated with understanding II.

Understanding and Additional Type Dimensions

Testing of hypothesis (6) examined the relationship between extraversion-intraversion (one type dimension) and understanding. Similarly the relationships between other type dimensions, i.e. sensing-intuition, thinking-feeling, and judging-perceiving, with understanding can be examined (see Table 4).

Understanding and sensing-intuition (with RS controlled):

For understanding I and SN the correlation was ($r = +.24$, $N = 42$) and the partial correlation with RS controlled was ($r_{12.3} = +.17$, $N = 42$) suggesting no association between SN and understanding I.

For understanding II and SN the correlation was ($r = +.18$, $N = 42$) and the partial correlation with RS controlled was ($r_{12.3} = +.14$, $N = 42$) suggesting no association between SN and understanding II.

Understanding and thinking-feeling (with RS controlled):

For understanding I and TF the correlation was ($r = -.20$, $N = 42$) and the partial correlation with RS controlled was ($r_{12.3} = -.23$, $N = 42$) suggesting slight but non-significant association between thinking and understanding I.

For understanding II and TF the correlation was ($r = +.18$, $N = 42$) and the partial correlation with RS controlled was ($r_{12.3} = +.17$, $N = 42$) suggesting no association between TF and understanding II.

Understanding and judging-perceiving (with RS controlled):

For understanding I and JP the correlation was ($r = -.06$, $N = 42$) and the partial correlation with RS controlled was ($r_{12.3} = -.11$, $N = 42$) suggesting no association between JP and understanding I.

For understanding II and JP the correlation was ($r = +.35$, $N = 42$) and the partial correlation with RS controlled was ($r_{12.3} = +.33$, $N = 42$) suggesting a significant association between perceiving and understanding II.

Understanding and Happiness

Several additional relationships can be considered which were not explicitly delineated in hypotheses (1 - 6):

(A) Understanding may or may not be associated with happiness, with RS and length of marriage controlled.

For understanding I and happiness the correlation was ($r = -.08$, $N = 42$) and the partial correlation with RS and length of marriage controlled was ($r_{12.34} = -.09$, $N = 42$) suggesting no association between understanding I and happiness.

For understanding II and happiness the correlation was ($r = -.19$, $N = 42$) and the partial correlation with RS and length of marriage controlled was ($r_{12.34} = -.22$, $N = 42$) suggesting slight but non-significant association between lower happiness scores and higher level II understanding.

(B) The feeling of being understood may or may not be associated with happiness (with length of marriage and RS controlled). For the feeling of being understood and happiness the correlation was ($r = +.35$, $N = 42$) and the partial correlation with RS and length of marriage controlled was ($r_{12.34} = +.38$, $N = 42$) suggesting a significant association between feeling of being understood and happiness.

Relationships of Mates to Each Other

Several additional relationships of mates in association with each other were found.

Happiness between mates was found to correlate highly: Mate (1, 2, 3 ... 21) with Mate (1', 2', 3', ... 21'), ($r = +.77$, $N = 21$) suggesting a strong significant tendency

for mates to agree on reported happiness.

Overall understanding scores between mates was found to correlate highly: (understanding I plus understanding II, mate 1, 2, 3, etc. ...21, with mate 1', 2', 3', etc. ...21'), ($r = +.57$, $N = 21$) suggesting a strong significant tendency for a high overall understanding score of a person to go with a high overall understanding score of his mate.

Understanding I of mate 1, 2, 3, ... 21, with understanding I of mate 1', 2', 3', ... 21' was found to correlate ($r = -.35$, $N = 21$) suggesting that there is some tendency (although non-significant for $N = 21$) for a high score of a person on understanding I to go with a low score of his mate on understanding I.

Understanding II of mate 1, 2, 3, ... 21, with understanding II of mate 1', 2', 3', ... 21' was found to correlate ($r = -.36$, $N = 21$) suggesting some tendency (but non-significant) for a high score of a person on understanding II to go along with a low score of his mate on understanding II.

It was also found that if a person received a high score on understanding I, there was a strong tendency for his mate to receive a low score on understanding II, and vice versa (i.e. if a person received a high score on understanding II, his mate tended to receive a low score

on understanding I) ($r = +.71$, $N = 42$).

Molar Versus Molecular Relationships

The distinction between analysis of scores computed by item matching versus matching on type preferences (0, 1, 2, 3, 4 matches on IE, SN, TF, JP) was discussed in the introduction, but is somewhat outside the scope of this study.

Nevertheless this distinction will be partially dealt with. For example, it was found that in computing scores by type preference matching (0-4) instead of by item matching, then understanding (combined I plus II) between mates was correlated $r = +.61$, $N = 42$ (versus $r = +.57$, $N = 42$, for item matching). Furthermore, understanding I mate 1, 2, 3, ... 21 with understanding II, mate 1', 2', 3', ... 21' correlated $r = +.61$, $N = 42$ (versus $r = +.71$, $N = 42$, for item matching).

The implication seems that there is little difference in analyzing by items or by type. However, the above correlations by type are only suggestive as comparisons, since the obtained range on the type preferences was only 1 - 4 for computing the understanding score by type matching. With such a restricted range another statistic besides the Pearson r would be more appropriate. Analyzing from a molar conception might well yield relations different from those obtained.

CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION

No tendencies for happiness to increase with assumptions of similarity (AS) were found, even when RS and length of marriage were controlled (hypothesis 1) suggesting that assuming similarity with the mate is not related to happiness in marriage.

Some small tendency toward curvilinearity was found to hold between Real Similarity (RS) and happiness in marriage (hypothesis 2) suggesting that to a mild extent intermediate values of real similarity, or moderate similarity between mates, tends to be associated with greater happiness in marriage than is either considerable dissimilarity or extreme similarity between mates on personality dimensions as measured by the MBTI. The implication from this is that a small amount of dissimilarity between the personalities of mates may be associated with greater happiness than if their personalities are either extremely dissimilar or extremely similar. This finding is in line with theory about marriage as related to the MBTI expressed by Myers (1971).

It was predicted that persons who had been married longer would assume less similarity (AS) between themselves and their mates than would mates in more recent marriages (hypothesis 3). At first glance it seems that there is a slight but unexpected opposite tendency for mates who have been married longer to assume more similarity (AS) between themselves and their mates than do mates in more recent marriages (hypothesis 3). Actually, this is artifactual, as most of this relationship is due to the effect of real similarity (RS) being strongly associated with both AS ($r = +.50$) and with the length of marriage ($r = +.28$). These relationships suggest that the following factors operate when comparing mates in "younger" versus "older" marriages for the tendency to assume similarity with their mates: (1) not surprisingly, the more similar the mates in fact are (RS), on the personality inventory, the more tendency there is to assume similarity between self and mate, and (2) in "older" marriages there is a tendency for persons to be more similar (RS) on the personality inventory than in "younger marriages." This latter tendency may be due to (a) mates growing more similar with time, and for (b) highly dissimilar persons being more likely to separate over time than more similar ones, and (c) some third factor(s) not apparent.

At any rate, the tendency for RS to be highly associated with AS, and RS in turn associated with length of marriage, accounts for most of the apparent tendency for AS to increase with length of marriage. When the strong effect of RS is controlled, there is no apparent relationship between length of marriage and assumptions of similarity ($r_{12.3} = +.07$).

It was predicted (hypothesis 4) that understanding would increase with length of marriage, but this prediction was not at all supported at either levels I or II understanding, suggesting (somewhat surprisingly) no differences in the component levels of understanding between longer versus more recent marriages. It should be emphasized here, however, that most of the marriages dealt with were fairly recent (the longest marriage being 7 years). Different results might have been obtained had the study included marriages of very long standing as well.

Although it was predicted (hypothesis 5) that intraversion in persons would be positively associated with assumptions of similarity (AS), a significant tendency toward the obverse was found ($r = -.21$, $r_{12.3} = -.31$, with RS controlled). This finding suggests that persons who score less on intraversion, or higher on extraversion, make more assumptions of similarity (AS) between themselves and their mates. This

is contrary to prior research findings (e.g. Dymond, 1949, 1950, 1954).

One possible reason for this outcome lies in the strong possibility that while Dymond was measuring, through the Rorschach test, the dimension extroversive-introversive, the MBTI measures extraversion-intraversion, which may be a different dimension from that measured by Dymond. Indeed it was recently found that these two dimensions do not seem to correlate well in some preliminary research findings.¹

Looking at the present definition of extraversion-intraversion (as construed in Jungian typology and MBTI theory), this finding suggests that persons who are more oriented to focus perception and judgement on people and things, as opposed to an orientation to the inner world of concepts and ideas, will make more assumptions of similarity between themselves and their mates.

A significant relationship was also found to hold between understanding and the extraversion-intraversion dimension. There was a near significant tendency for persons higher on intraversion to better predict their mates'

¹Personal communication with Professor Molly Harrower, and Assistant Professor Mary McCaulley, Department of Clinical Psychology, University of Florida.

self descriptions (level I understanding). On the other hand, there was a significant tendency for persons higher on extraversion to better predict what their mates would predict about them (level II understanding). Thus, introverts who are more oriented to the inner world, focusing on concepts and ideas, tended to do better on level I understanding, while extraverts, who are more oriented to outer world, focusing on people and things, tended to do better on level II understanding.

This finding also suggests that it is wise to draw the distinction between levels I and II when discussing understanding or empathy, as the two levels seem to be associated with, and tapping into, different personality factors.

Besides extraversion-introversion, judging-perceiving was the only other personality dimension that was found to be a significant factor associated with understanding. There was no association between judging-perceiving and level I understanding. There was a significant positive association between judging-perceiving and level II understanding. Thus, the perceiving mode rather than the judging mode is associated with a person's being better able to predict what his mate will predict that he will answer about himself.

It is interesting that while it was hypothesized that

happiness would be positively associated with understanding one's mate, an opposite trend was found. For higher scores on level II understanding (i.e. being able to predict what a mate would say mate prime would say about mate) less happiness was indicated. Might this possibly mean that whatever it takes to develop a better understanding of one's mate, especially coming to understand how one's mate understands him, may lead to decreased happiness?

In considering this relationship it is interesting to ponder just how much work and pain (at the expense of happiness?) might be involved in developing a good understanding of how one's mate understands him. Developing a good idea of how a mate believes mate prime sees mate might for some reason decrease just how happy mate is able to report that he is! This does not hold for mate prime. On the other hand, the feeling of being understood by mate prime was strongly and positively associated with happiness.

Of particular interest is the outcome of the analysis of mates relative to each other. This approach to the analysis, in some but not all aspects, is not unlike a tactical one suggested by Sidman (1960) termed "direct replication." Here the study is viewed as twenty-one direct replications as there were 21 couples. Each couple was subjected to the same response predicting task or interpersonal

perception paradigm. In examining the outcome in this fashion, mates were found to agree strongly with each other on reported level of happiness ($r = +.77$) and the combined component levels of understanding ($r = +.57$).

Mates who were high on level I understanding tended to be paired with mates who were low ($r = -.35$) and mates high on level II tended toward pairing with mates low on level II ($r = -.36$). But the real clue to what may be going on here came in pairing level I scores for persons with level II scores of their mates ($r = +.71$).

These outcomes for the understanding levels strongly suggest that in marriages one mate is the level I understander while the other mate is the level II understander. In the 21 marriages observed, there tended to be a mate in each partnership who did well on predicting what mate prime's view of mate would be, in which case mate prime usually did well, in complementary fashion, in predicting mate's self description. Thus, one person usually had a good understanding of the other person's self viewpoint, while that second person had a good idea of the first person's viewpoint of his (second person's) self viewpoint.

Another way of saying the above is that in marriage there tends to be an understander of the other's self view, and a person who well understands this as his mate's

understanding of him.

How this complementarity between level I and level II understanding comes about is unknown--only speculation can be offered. Perhaps, within a marriage a mate has often described (either verbally or behaviorally) to mate prime just how he sees himself. Mate prime then builds up a good, accurate view of how mate sees himself. Mate in turn will probably have a good idea of how mate prime might predict mate would describe self. Another way of construing this is that mate prime has described himself less (or perhaps more guardedly) than mate.

There is no reason to suspect at the outset that this above process, if explanatory, should not be reciprocal between mate and mate prime. However, that it was found that level I scores between mates and level II scores between mates are negatively correlated ($r = -.35$, $r = -.36$, respectively) suggests otherwise. The implication is that if the above communication process is operating, it is unilateral with respect to mates in marriage. One mate is the self describer and understander of how his mate understands his own self description and the other mate is the understander of his mate's self description.

It would be interesting to see if this unilaterality or complementarity between mates on levels I and II is

related to any of the personality dimensions IE, SN, TF, or JP though especially the IE orientation. Again, using an analysis in line with Sidman (1960) the following statements were found to be significant for the 21 married couples:

For a married couple with mate and mate prime:

(1) If mate is greater than mate prime on intraversion, then mate is greater than mate prime on understanding I: observed true for 15 couples, false for 5, and indeterminate for 1, chi square = 4.76, $p < .05$.

(2) If mate is greater than mate prime on extraversion, then mate is greater than mate prime on understanding II: observed true for 14 couples, false for 3, and indeterminate for 3, chi square = 4.76, $p < .05$.

(3) If mate is greater than mate prime on feeling, then mate is greater than mate prime on understanding II: observed true for 14 couples, false for 5, and indeterminate for 2, chi square = 3.86, $p < .05$.

All other relationships between understanding and the personality dimensions IE, SN, TF, and JP were non-significant.

The above additional findings suggest that with the married couples in the present study, usually the mate higher on intraversion did better than his mate on level I understanding. The mate higher on extraversion and feeling did

better on level II understanding. One possible general implication might be that in a marriage one might expect the mate who is more oriented to the inner world, with focus on concepts and ideas, to be better able to predict his mate's self description. The mate who is more oriented to the outer world, with focus on people and things and/or who makes discriminations based on feelings of valued and not valued rather than impersonal discriminations between true and false, will be better able to predict what mate prime will predict for mate's self description. However, accuracy on level II understanding might also be accounted for by simply saying that your mate will say about you essentially what you say about yourself, and then having a mate who makes accurate predictions about what you will say about yourself. Looked at this way, then coming up with a high score on understanding I is clearly the more difficult task than obtaining a high score on understanding II.

Closing Comments

. Before closing this discussion of results and theory, the author wishes to point out that aside from some of the interesting findings previously outlined, the real value and personal impact for the author came through collaboration

and dialogue with the persons participating. Involvement in this study has only further reinforced the author's bias that in research of this nature, studies should be a collection and exchange of relevant, personally worthwhile information and ideas between persons.

The group of young marrieds investigated in this study participated without coercion of any kind, and came in hopes of learning something about themselves and their interaction with each other. The author sincerely believes that participants received interesting, personally useful information in the feedback sessions, and the author was continually amazed by, and appreciative of, their discerning curiosity about, and examination of, the feedback. They, as a whole, showed sharp intellects and abilities to rapidly grasp often even the subtleties and intricacies of some of the interpersonal perception measures, often yielding up creative and valuable methodological and conceptual insights to the investigator.

As for implications toward future research, Mrs. Myers, the developer of the MBTI, is presently developing additional internal indices besides IE, SN, TF, and JP. These indices, when released, might be used for an additional analysis, similar to the one presented here, toward further delineating some of the personality parameters of

interpersonal perception and marital happiness.

In future research in the area of interpersonal perception, understanding, and empathy, it would seem that the distinction drawn between levels I and II understanding should continue to be made since it was found that the two levels tended to be non-additive (additivity has sometimes been assumed in previous research). In the present study these two levels of understanding appeared to be operating independently and were associated with different personality factors.

As a follow-up study it might be interesting to consider other populations or groups, for example, elderly married couples, marrieds in non academic settings, or other mates, in order to examine the possibility of generalizing the findings beyond the group of young, highly educated, recently married, college people investigated in the present study.

As a final comment toward the implications of this study, it seems evident that the paradigm and procedure as employed here for research could also be of considerable use as an interpersonal diagnostic and conceptual aid for initial constructive input to counselors or therapists and their married clients in the therapeutic counseling situation.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
BIOGRAPHICAL INVENTORY

Name: _____.

Sex: M_____; F_____.

Age: _____.

Occupation: student_____: other (please state)_____.

If you stated an occupation other than student,
how long have you worked at this?_____. Also,
what was your prior occupation?_____.

Education: completed high school: yes_____; no_____.

How many years, if any, did you spend as an
undergraduate in college?_____. Did you re-
ceive a college degree? yes_____; no_____.

How many years, if any, did you spend as a
graduate student?_____. Do you have a graduate
degree(s)? _____.

What was your major in undergraduate school?

_____. What was your major
in graduate school?_____.

Marriage: number of prior marriages if any_____.

length of present marriage_____.

APPENDIX A (Continued)

number of children, if any, by this marriage_____.

number of children, if any, by former
marriage(s)_____.

Religion: Catholic_____; Jewish_____; Protestant_____;
None_____; Other (please state)_____

APPENDIX B

FEELINGS ABOUT YOUR MARRIAGE AND YOUR MATE

Directions: Place a check before any of the following statements which represent your feelings about your marriage or your mate. Check as many or as few as describe your feelings. Be assured that your responses on this portion of the inventory will be held in strictest confidence.

- 1) _____ I believe our marriage is reasonably happy.
- 2) _____ My marriage is a very happy one.
- 3) _____ Although my mate and I get along very well together, I think I could be happier married to someone else.
- 4) _____ I have never thought of my marriage as having made me particularly happy or unhappy.
- 5) _____ I don't think anyone could possibly be happier than my mate and I are with one another.
- 6) _____ Although I am usually happy with my mate, he (she) occasionally makes me feel miserable.
- 7) _____ My marriage is happier than the average, but less so than the very successful ones.
- 8) _____ My marriage borders on being unhappy.
- 9) _____ I think I could be much happier if I had married someone else.
- 10) _____ My marriage could be much happier than it is.
- 11) _____ My marriage is a happy one.
- 12) _____ I think my marriage is neither more nor less happy than most marriages.
- 13) _____ I'm quite happily married.
- 14) _____ My marriage is an unhappy one.
- 15) _____ I can't conceive of anyone being more happily married than I am.
- 16) _____ I have known very little happiness in my marriage.
- 17) _____ If until now your marriage has been at all unhappy, how confident are you that it will work out all right in the future? (Check):
(a) very confident____; (c) confident____; (d) somewhat uncertain____; (e) very uncertain____; (z) marriage has not been at all unhappy_____.

- 18) Everything considered, how happy has your marriage been for you? (Check): (l) extraordinarily happy____; (n) decidedly happy____; (o) happy____; (p) somewhat happy____; (q) average____; (r) somewhat unhappy____; (s) unhappy____; (t) decidedly unhappy____; (u) extremely unhappy____.
- 19) If your marriage is now at all unhappy, how long has it been so? (Check): (u) over 12 months____; (v) 6 - 11 months____; (w) 3 - 5 months____; (x) less than 3 months____; (z) never unhappy____.
- 20) Everything considered, how happy has your marriage been for your mate? (Check): (l) extraordinarily happy____; (n) decidedly happy____; (o) happy____; (p) somewhat happy____; (q) average____; (r) somewhat unhappy____; (s) unhappy____; (t) decidedly unhappy____; (u) extremely unhappy____.
- 21) Even if satisfied with your mate, have you ever felt that you might have been at all happier if married to another type of person? (Check): (u) frequently____; (v) occasionally____; (x) rarely____; (z) never____.

Scoring: The letters or the numbers before each of the items of the above constitute the code for scoring the replies. Their code values are as follows:

a....4	h...-1	o....6	v....1	3...-1	10...-1
b....3	i....0	p....5	w....2	4...-1	11....1
c....2	j....1	q....4	x....3	5....5	12...-1
d....1	k....2	r....3	y....4	6...-1	13....1
e....0	l....9	s....2	z....1	7...-1	14...-1
f...-1	m....8	t....1	1....1	8...-1	15....5
g...-2	n....7	u....0	2....2	9...-1	16...-1

Procedure: For each item checked (number or letter), find the appropriate score, and sum across items.

APPENDIX C

MODIFIED PROCEDURE FOR THE MYERS-BRIGGS TYPE INDICATOR (F)

Directions: Please read and follow the directions printed on the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (next page). However, notice that I have included 3 answer sheets with the attached labels: (1) my own answer is; (2) my mate will answer; (3) my mate will say that I will answer.

I would like for you to consider each question on the Indicator in these three ways, and answer accordingly. Thus, for each question choose (1) the answer which comes closest to how you usually feel or act; (2) the answer which comes closest to how your mate will say he (or she) usually feels or acts, and; (3) the answer which comes closest to how your mate will say you usually feel or act.

For example, consider the following sample question:

167. Are your interests

(A) few and lasting (B) varied

For this example let's say a man taking this test with the three answer sheets knows that (a) his interests are usually few and lasting (b) his mate sees herself as having varied interests, and (c) he feels that his wife would guess that he would say that his interests are few and lasting, rather than varied. He would fill in the answer sheets as follows:

answer sheet no. (1)

my own answer is

167.	A	B
	☒	☐
	☐	☐

APPENDIX C (Continued)

answer sheet no. (2)

my mate will answer

167.	A	B
	-----	-----
	-----	-----

answer sheet no. (3)

my mate will say that I will answer

167.	A	B
	-----	-----
	-----	-----

Consider all of the questions one at a time, in the above three ways, and use answer sheets 1 - 3 to record your answers. Please answer these questions while working by yourself. If you have any difficulty please talk only with the person administering this test.

Optional test feedback: When you complete this testing session the collection of data for the experiment ends. However, some of you may, for various reasons, be interested in what the test findings in this portion suggest as to the type of person you are, where your special strengths lie, etc. If you are interested in this, then let's arrange an appointment to go over some of the results. You may sign up for this optional feedback upon completion of this test if you so desire. Thanks for participating!

APPENDIX D

CORRELATION MATRIX FOR PEARSON r's

Understanding II	Happiness	RS	AS	Feeling of being understood	E-I	S-N	T-F	J-P	Length of marriage	
** -.34	-.08	+.25			* +.26	+.24	-.20	-.06	+.05	Understanding I
	-.19	+.17			* -.28	+.18	+.18	** +.35	-.06	Understanding II
		+.12	+.06	** +.35						Happiness
			**** +.50	+.23	+.12	** +.34	+.07	+.17	* +.28	RS
					-.21				+.20	AS
									-.04	Feeling of being understood

* $p < .05$, $r = .26$, one-tailed, $N = 42$

** $p < .05$, $r = .30$, two-tailed, $N = 42$

*** $p < .01$, $r = .36$, one-tailed, $N = 42$

**** $p < .01$, $r = .39$, two-tailed, $N = 42$

Note: The likelihood of obtaining a correlation by chance is increased as total number of r's is increased. The matrix at least indicates relative strength of relationships among variables.

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
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Brian Jay Lindner was born in Santa Barbara, California on October 27, 1946. With the exception of four years which he spent in the mid-West, he attended Santa Barbara schools and graduated from Santa Barbara High in June, 1964. He attended the University of California at Santa Barbara, and graduated as a member of Phi Beta Kappa with high honors and a Bachelor of Arts degree in psychology in June, 1968.

The following September he began graduate work in psychology at the University of Florida. He received the degree of Master of Arts in psychology and membership to Phi Kappa Phi in August, 1970. He has held several clinical traineeships and teaching assistantships. He interned at the University of Florida Counseling Center and the Psychology Clinic of the J. Hillis Miller Health Center in Gainesville, Florida, while working toward the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in psychology with a major in clinical and a minor in philosophy.


After graduation he plans to pursue employment and the practice of clinical psychology in the state of California.

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
Hugh C. Davis, Jr., Chairman
Professor Clinical Psychology

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Molly Harrower
Visiting Professor of Psychology

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Robert H. Hornberger
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Assistant Professor of Psychology

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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William B. Jones
Assistant Professor of Philosophy

This dissertation was submitted to the Department of Psychology in the College of Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate Council, and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

August, 1972

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